Introduction
This addendum includes proofs that were deferred due to page constraints imposed on Oh andÖzer (2012) . For the sake of completeness, we provide all proofs including those that were published. In addition, the addendum provides complete analyses of the following extensions: (A1) The supplier incurs cost in obtaining a forecast update; (A2) the supplier sets the wholesale price; (A3) the supplier reneges and does not build the capacity; and finally (A4) the forecast update is additive.
Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems in Oh andÖzer(2012)
Proof of Theorem 1. For Part 1, we first prove that X n is integrable. This property holds directly from the square-integrability of X N +1 . Then, we have E[X i n+1
n ] = X i n , where the second equality is from the tower property of conditional expectation. Hence, Part 1 is true. For Part 2, first note that σ(X i n ) ⊆ F i n . Then, again from the tower property, we have E[X N +1 |X i n ] = E[E[X N +1 |F i n ]|X i n ] = E[X i n |X i n ] = X i n . For Part 3, note that σ(X i n ) ⊆ F i n+l for every l ≥ 0. Then, from the tower property, we have E[X i n+l
In addition, for any random variable Y that is measurable in F i n , we have
Therefore, ∆ i l is uncorrelated with F i n for every l ≥ n, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition, we have F i n ⊆ F cf n for every i ∈ {s, m} and n. Then, we have the following inequality:
, where the second equality is from the fact that X i n is measurable on F cf n , the inequality is from (X cf n ) 2 − 2X i n X cf n + (X i n ) 2 ≥ 0, and the last equality is from E[X N +1 X Proof of Theorem 3. For Part 1, we first note that σ(X s n ) ⊆ F s n ⊆ F m n+l for every l ≥ 0. Then, from the tower property, we have E[X m n+l |X s n ] = E[E[X N +1 |F m n+l ]|X s n ] = E[X N +1 |X s n ] = X s n . For Part 2, first note that X m n = X s n + A n ∈ σ(X s n , A n ). Because both X m n and X s n are measurable in F m n , and we also have σ(X s n , A n ) ⊆ F m n . Then, we have E[X N +1 |X s n , A n ] = E[E[X N +1 |F m n ]|X s n , A n ] = E[X m n |X s n , A n ] = X m n . For Part 3, we need to note that (F s 1 , ..., F s n , F m n ) forms a filtration. Then, Part 3 follows Part 4 of Theorem 1.
We remark that we suppress X s n in profit functions when doing so does not cause any ambiguity for two reasons: (i) notational convenience, (ii) to highlight that the proof and the result for holds for general scenarios that does not involve forecast updates.
Proof of Theorem 4. We first prove that IC implies IC1 and IC2. Under IC,ξ = ξ is the maximizer of Π m n (K(ξ), ξ)−P (ξ). Hence,ξ = ξ meets the first-order and the second-order necessary conditions. The first-order condition is given as ∂Π m n (K(ξ),ξ)−P (ξ) ∂ξ ξ =ξ = (r − w)(1 − G n (
, and the second-order condition is given as
By taking derivative on the first-order condition with respect to ξ, we have −(r − w)
This result and the second-order condition imply that K (ξ) ≥ 0, i.e., K(ξ) is increasing in ξ. Next, by the envelope theorem, we have
xg n (x)dx, which concludes that IC implies IC1 and IC2.
Next we prove that IC1 and IC2 imply IC.
We can prove the case witĥ ξ < ξ in a similar way.
Proof of Theorem 5. To prove Part 1, define
Then, (IC2) implies that q(ξ, K b n (R m n )) is a quasi-convex function, where its first-order derivative is zero if and only if K(ξ) = K b n (R m n ). The quasi-convexity implies that R m n is a convex set.
We prove Part 2 by contradiction. Suppose that
holds only when P (ξ) < 0, which concludes the proof for Part 2. We can prove Part 3 in a similar way.
Finally, we prove Part 5. Suppose that (K b n (R m n ), 0) ∈ {K(·), P (·)}. We first prove that
is not zero for every point that satisfies q(ξ, K b n (R m n )) = 0, q(ξ, K b n (R m n )) = 0 can hold at most two points. The result implies that R m n and R m n coincide, and
Proof of Theorem 6. We denote {K(·), P (·)} by M and {K(·),P (·)} byM. If R m n = φ,M = M, and thus the theorem holds trivially. If (K b n (R m n ), 0) ∈ M, Part 4 of Theorem 5 implies that M = M, and thus the theorem also holds. Next we consider the case in which R m n = φ and (K b n (R m n ), 0) ∈ M. We first show thatM satisfies (IC). Parts 2 and 3 of Theorem 5 imply that
Hence,M satisfies (IC2). BecauseP (ξ) = 0 for every ξ ∈ R m n , we also have
xg n (x)dx for every ξ ∈ R m n , which implies (IC1). Hence,M satisfies (IC).
Next we show that the full acceptance strategy is optimal for the manufacturer underM by a contradiction argument. Suppose that underM the full acceptance strategy is not optimal for the manufacturer. We denote the manufacturer's optimal strategy underM byR m n . Because the full acceptance strategy is not optimal,
n is the manufacturer's optimal strategy under M.
Finally, we prove that the two menus M andM result in the same outcome in terms of the capacity decision and the transfer payment. When ξ n ∈ R m n , the manufacturer accepts (K(ξ n ), P (ξ n )) under both M andM. When ξ n ∈ R m n , the manufacturer accepts (K(ξ n ),P (ξ n )) = (K b n (R m n ), 0) underM and rejects the menu and lets the supplier build K b n (R m n ) under M. The two cases are identical in terms of final capacity decision and the transfer payment. Thus, M andM yield the same expected profits for both the supplier and the manufacturer, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Lemma 1. Part 1 holds because Π m n (K, ξ) ≥ 0 for every
This profit function depends only on K(·) and P (0). Because the manufacturer's profit is an increasing function of ξ, Π m n (K(ξ), ξ) − P (ξ) ≥ 0 holds for every ξ if and only if P (0) ≤ 0. Because the supplier's expected profit increases in P (0), we have P (0) = 0 at the optimum. Thus, the supplier's relaxed problem can be equivalently written as
To show that the optimal K(·) is K r n (·), we first relax (IC2), and show that K r n (ξ) is the optimal solution without (IC2). Next we show that K r n (ξ) satisfies (IC2), which establishes its optimality. Without (IC2), the optimal K(ξ) is given as the maximizer of H(K(ξ), ξ) for each ξ. We show that K r n (ξ) maximizes H(K(ξ), ξ) for each ξ and that it is unique. The first-order derivative of
). Because log-normal distributions have increasing generalized failure rates,
≥ 0. The generalized failure rate of a random variable is defined as
, where f n (x) and F n (x) are the p.d.f. and the c.d.f. of the random variable. All random variables with increasing failure rates have IGFRs, and other common classes of random variables have IGFRs, including Log-normal, Gamma and Weibull. In addition,
is strictly decreasing in K when h(K, ξ) = 0, which establishes the uniqueness of the solution for h(K, ξ) = 0 and that it maximizes the integrand. To show that
ξfn(ξ) (r − w)zg n (z), and denote the solution forĥ(z, ξ) = 0 by z(ξ). Because K r n (ξ) = X s n ξz(ξ), K r n (ξ) is increasing in ξ if z(ξ) is increasing in ξ. Because ξ n has an increasing generalized failure rate,
Proof of Theorem 7. We first prove Part 1. Note that
whose first-order condition after normalization is given as
)) − c n ≥ 0. By taking derivative on (9) with respect to ξ h , we have
≥ 0 in a similar way.
Next, we prove Part 2. We define
=R, which implies thatR satisfies (PC1) and (PC2). Finally, because
Next we prove Part 3. We consider a menu {K(·),
, ξ) and P (ξ) > 0 for every ξ > 0. Suppose for a contradiction argument that under this menu the full acceptance strategy is not optimal for the manufacturer. In this case, Part 5 of Theorem 5 implies that R m n = [0, ξ] for some ξ > 0. Then, for R m n to satisfy (PC2), which is a necessary condition for the manufacturer's optimal strategy, we must have
is strictly increasing in K(ξ) and
. Then, Part 3 of Theorem 7 implies that (FA) holds.
Proof of Theorem 8. By construction, K h n (ξ) is increasing in ξ, i.e., it satisfies (IC2). Because the reservation price P h n (ξ) is constructed by integrating (IC1) with
f a n (ξ) holds for every ξ and P h n (0) = 0, Lemma 2 implies that this menu satisfies (FA). Hence, {K h n (·), P h n (·)} is a feasible solution for (5).
Proof of Theorem 9. The fact that π cr n (X s n ) ≤ π cr1 n (X s n ) stems directly from the fact that π cr1 n (X s n ) is the resulting expected profit of a relaxed problem of (5). By the definition of K so n (ξ), we have Π tot n (K, ξ) ≤ Π tot n (K so n (ξ), ξ) for every K and ξ. Then, Part 2 of Theorem 7 implies that if (FA)
Proof of Theorem 10. We first defineK(·)
, which are the normalized decision variables. If we replace K(·) and P (·) withK(·) andP (·) in (IC), we have Π m n (K(ξ), 1, ξ) −P (ξ) ≥ Π m n (K(ξ), 1,ξ) −P (ξ) for every ξ andξ. This new constraint is independent of X s n . Similarly, if we replace decision variables in (FA) with the normalized ones, we have
,P (·)), 1, ξ) for every ξ, which is also independent of X s n . Note that the supplier's expected profit is given as
The optimal {K(·),P (·)} that maximizes the supplier's profit is thus the maximizer of
under the two normalized constraints. Because this objective function and the two constraints are independent of X s n , the optimalK(·) andP (·) are independent of X s n . Because K(·) = X s nK (·) and P (·) = X s nP (·), we can conclude that the optimal K cr n (ξ) and P cr n (ξ) are proportional to X s n . Because π cr
, which concludes the proof for i = cr. We can prove the case for i = h in a similar way using the normalized decision variables.
Proof of Theorem 11. We first prove that the menu {(K(ξ) = K w n , P (ξ) = 0) : ξ ∈ [0, ∞)} is a feasible solution for (5). Because only one contract is offered, (IC) holds trivially. Let R m n be the manufacturer's optimal strategy under this menu.
, which concludes the proof.
Proof of Theorem 12. From Theorems 10 and 11, we have that π n (X s n ) = X s n (π n (1) + C n ) − C n . We first show that this structure remain the same when the supplier offers the heuristic menu of contracts instead of the optimal menu. Because
The proofs for Theorems 12 and 13 are based on this structure. Hence, these results hold for both the optimal and the heuristic menus of contracts.
To determine the structure of the optimal stopping policy, we use the method proposed by Oh
. These two functions have the following relationship:
which is a linear function of X s n . Note that it is optimal to offer a contract at period n if B n (X s n ) ≤ 0.
Using these properties, we prove the theorem. We first prove by induction that B n (X s n ) is convex in X s n for every n. First note that M n (X s n ) is linear, and hence is convex in X s n . Then, at period N − 1, we have B N −1 (X s N −1 ) = M N −1 (X s N −1 ), which is convex in X s N −1 . Next assume for an induction argument that B n+1 (X) is convex in X. Then, the composition max{0, B n+1 (X)} is also convex in X because function max{0, X} is convex increasing. For any realization of δ s n , max{0, B n+1 (X s n+1 )} is convex in X s n , which implies that
Proof of Theorem 13. We defineπ n ≡ π n (1) + C n for notational convenience. For Part 1, we first note that B n (X s n ) is convex from the proof of Theorem 12. We prove that B n (0) ≤ 0 when C n is increasing. When X s n = 0, X s l = 0 almost surely for every l ≥ n. Therefore, V n (0) = −C n , which implies that B n (0) = −(C n+1 − C n ) ≤ 0. If a convex function satisfies B n (0) ≤ 0, then B n (X s n ) can cross 0 at most once from below to above in (0, ∞). Therefore, the lower threshold, L n , is 0, and the upper threshold policy is optimal.
For Part 2, we first define η n ≡ max m>nπm . We prove by induction that B n (X s n ) = (η n −π n )X s n for all n. For period n = N − 1, we have
n , where η n =π n+1 by definition. Next assume for an induction argu-
We next prove that the optimal policy always stops at period n * . For n < n * , η n =π n * , hence η n >π n by the definition of n * . In this case, B n (X s n ) ≥ 0 for all X s n , and it is always optimal to continue the process. For n = n * , we have η n * ≤π n , which implies that B n (X s n ) ≤ 0. Hence, the optimal policy always stops at period n * .
Proof of Theorem 14. First note that as in the decentralized case, the optimal supply chain profit and the demand forecast have the following property: π cs n (X m n ) = X m n (π cs n (1) + C n ) − C n . To prove this theorem, we can replicate the proofs of Theorems 12 and 13. We only need to replace π n with π cs n and replace X s n with X m n . Note that Theorems 12 and 13 do not depend on the value of π n , and the only required property of X s n for those theorems is its Martingale property, which X m n also has. Hence, all properties remain the same.
A1. When the Supplier Incurs Forecast Update Cost
Often forecast related costs are sunk because firms invest in forecasting upfront regardless of whether they obtain information updates. Hence, most managerial decisions and related literature treats these costs as exogenous to the decision problem. However, firms may incur some fixed cost while obtaining new information in some rare cases. In such cases, the supplier may want to expedite the capacity decision to avoid extra forecasting costs. Suppose that the supplier incurs a cost κ n to obtain the demand information δ s n . In this case, the only change in the supplier's problem is in the reward function h n (X s n ) in §4.1, where we replace zero with −κ n . All structural properties of the mechanism design and optimal stopping policy remain the same except for Part 2 of Theorem 13.
In that case, even when the fixed capacity cost is constant over time, an upper threshold policy would be optimal as in Part 1.
A2. When the Supplier Sets the Wholesale Price
Supply chain partners often establish a relationship by negotiating on wholesale price and product requirements several quarters to a couple of years in advance of the production date. The wholesale price also depends on several factors such as the market price of similar products. Long after this agreement, forecast revisions are often obtained closer to the time when capacity investment decision is made. For example, in the semiconductor equipment industry, a manufacturer and a supplier first establish a supply relationship by agreeing on price and equipment specification.
Long after this agreement, the manufacturer shares her demand forecast via soft orders over time before placing a firm order. The supplier makes capacity investment decision during this forecast update horizon. This practice is common in several industries such as telecommunication, semiconductor, and automotive (Cohen et al 2003,Özer and Wei 2006, and references therein) . We remark that the proposed mechanism enables firms to use more accurate demand information for the capacity decision. It works effectively regardless of (i) how the wholesale price is negotiated or (ii) the resulting wholesale price (Table 2) . However, in theory, the supplier could perhaps dictate the wholesale price simultaneously with the capacity reservation contract, i.e., the supplier offers {(K(ξ), P (ξ), w(ξ)) : ξ ∈ (0, ∞)} to the manufacturer. In this case, the supplier essentially has the ultimate power and the manufacturer only has a constant reservation profit which is likely to be zero because no prior relationship has been established between the two. Then, the optimal contract is given as follows.
Theorem 15. When the supplier offers a menu of contract {K(ξ), P (ξ), w(ξ)}, the optimal contract parameters are w cr n (ξ) = r, K cr n (ξ) = K so n (ξ), and P cr n (ξ) = 0.
Proof of Theorem 15. We first show that the given menu satisfies both IC and PC. If the manufacturer choosesξ, her expected profit is (r − w(ξ))E n [min(X s n ξ n n , K(ξ))] − P (ξ) = 0, which is independent ofξ and is equal to her reservation profit. Thus, both IC and PC hold. We next prove that the given menu maximizes the supplier's expected profit. Note that the supplier's expected profit is upper bounded by (r − c)E n [min(X s n ξ n n , K so n (ξ n ))] − c n K so n (ξ n ) − C n . The supplier's expected profit under the given menu is the same as this upper bound, which concludes the proof.
In this case, the supplier would set the wholesale price equal to the retail price. He earns the optimal supply chain profit and the manufacturer earns nothing. The supplier can ensure the manufacturer's participation with a marginal transfer payment while collecting all revenue from sales. In practice, such outcome can hardly appear. To study how firms negotiate the wholesale price, bargaining models are more appropriate than the adverse-selection models (Nagarajan and Sosic 2008, Lovejoy 2010) . Our mechanism is a solution for credible information sharing and capacity decision. It works effectively regardless of how the wholesale price is set.
A3. When the Supplier Reneges and Does Not Build Any Capacity
Before the beginning of the capacity planning horizon, the supplier and the manufacturer had established the supply chain by agreeing on a wholesale price contract. The supplier agreed on the contract because costs and demand forecast are such that building capacity and selling products is profitable for the supplier. Hence, in §4, we do not take into account the case in which the supplier reneges the agreement and does not build any capacity during the capacity planning horizon.
In practice, firms do not generally take such an action because it can critically harm the firm's reputation and a lawsuit can also be filed. We can extend our model in §4 to the case in which the supplier may not build any capacity by simply adding one additional period N + 1. At period n = N , the supplier can either stop and build capacity or delays the decision to period N + 1. The delay at period N means that the supplier decides not to build any capacity. At period N + 1, the reward function is given as h N +1 (X s N +1 ) = 0. With this new formulation, the optimality of the control-band policy continues to hold.
Theorem 16. A control band policy that offers a capacity reservation contract at period n if X s n ∈ [L n , U n ] is optimal, and the optimal thresholds are given as U n ≡ sup{X s n :
Proof of Theorem 16. We use the same definition for M n (X s n ) as in the proof of Theorem 12. At the last period, we now have M N (X s n ) = −X s N (π N (1) + C N ) + C N , which is a linear thus convex function of X s n . The convexity of M n (X s n ) is the only required property for the proof of Theorem 12. Thus, the rest of the proof is the same as before.
When the demand forecast is very small, the supplier may earn a negative profit by building capacity because of the fixed capacity cost. In this case, the supplier would delay the capacity decision to the next period for n < N . If the supplier still anticipates a negative expected profit at period n = N , then the supplier would not to build any capacity. Such decisions are cast by the lower threshold. If the demand forecast is smaller than L n , then the supplier would delay the capacity decision, which at the last period means that the supplier does not build any capacity at all. Even when the fixed capacity cost increases in C n , the control-band policy remain to be optimal unlike in Theorem 13. With the option of not building any capacity, the lower threshold does not disappear in any case.
A4. When Forecast Updates are Additive
In the main part of the paper, we have modeled the evolutions of demand forecasts as an m-MMAFE. Although empirical results show that the multiplicative MMFE fits the actual data better than the additive MMFE, both models have been widely used in the literature. Here we solve the supplier's problem with the additive model. The solution method and the structural properties are the same as in the multiplicative case discussed in §5. Hence, we focus on analytical results without repeating the discussions on the structural properties.
In the additive case the expected profits of the two decision makers are given as
is an a-MMAFE, ξ n and n are independent normal random variables. Thus, the support of the manufacturer's private information ξ n is (−∞, ∞). During the third stage, the supplier offers a menu of contracts {(K(ξ), P (ξ)) : ξ ∈ (−∞, ∞)} to the manufacturer, and the manufacturer's optimal strategy R m n is a subset of (−∞, ∞). Then, the formulation for the supplier's three stage stochastic decision process remains the same as in §4.
We first solve the third stage mechanism design problem (4). We provide an equivalent condition for (IC).
Theorem 17. (IC) holds if and only if the following two conditions hold:
Proof of Theorem 17. We first prove that IC implies IC1 and IC2. Under IC,ξ = ξ is the maximizer of the manufacturer's expected profit Π m n (K(ξ), ξ) + P (ξ). Hence,ξ = ξ meets the first-order and the second-order necessary conditions. The first-order condition is given as (r − w)(1 − G n (K(ξ) − X s n − ξ))K (ξ) − P (ξ) = 0, and the second-order condition is given as
By taking derivative on the firstorder condition with ξ, we have
This equation combined with the second-order condition implies that K (ξ) ≥ 0. Next, by the envelope theorem, we have
, which concludes that IC implies IC1 and IC2.
Next we prove that IC1 and IC2 imply IC. For everyξ ≥ ξ, we have Π m
.e., IC holds. The case witĥ ξ < ξ can be proved in a similar way.
Next, we provide structural properties of the manufacturer's optimal strategy R m n .
Theorem 18. If {K(·), P (·)} satisfies (IC), the following properties hold:
1. R m n is a convex set, and thus
Proof of Theorem 18. To prove Part 1, we define q(ξ,
) is a quasi-convex function, where its first-order derivative is zero if and only if K(ξ) = K b n (R m n ). The quasi-convexity directly implies that R m n is a convex set. The proofs of Parts 2 to 5 are the same as the proof of Theorem 5.
Parts 4 and 5 of Theorem 18 imply that every incentive compatible menus belongs to either one of the two classes of menus. Under each menu of the first class, which is described in Part 4, the full acceptance strategy is optimal for the manufacturer. For each menu of the second class, which is described in Part 5, we can always construct an equivalent menu that is of the first class using the same method introduced in Theorem 6.
n , and (K(ξ),P (ξ)) = (K(ξ), P (ξ)) otherwise. Then, {K(·),P (·)} satisfies (IC), and under {K(·),P (·)} the full acceptance strategy is optimal for the manufacturer. The two menus, {K(·), P (·)} and {K(·),P (·)}, yield the same expected profits for the supplier and the manufacturer.
Proof of Theorem 19. We denote {K(·), P (·)} by M and {K(·),P (·)} byM. If R m n = φ,M = M, and thus the theorem holds trivially. If (K b n (R m n ), 0) ∈ M, Part 4 of Theorem 18 implies that M = M, and thus the theorem also holds. Next we consider the case in which R m n = φ and
We first show thatM satisfies (IC). Parts 2 and 3 of Theorem 18 imply that
n , which implies (IC1). Hence,M satisfies (IC). Then, the rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 6.
Due to Theorem 19, it is sufficient for the supplier to consider the menus of contracts that satisfy (IC) and (FA) when designing the optimal menu of contract. In other words, the optimal menu of contracts can be obtained by solving (5) as in the multiplicative case. Because (5) is an has an increasing failure rate,
Theorem 10 and Theorem 22 show the major differences between the multiplicative and the additive cases. When demand uncertainty is additive to the demand forecast X s n , the supplier would build X s n units of capacity and some additional amounts for uncertain parts of demand. The additional amount is independent of the size of X s n . Hence, the reservation capacity level K cr n (ξ) is additive to X s n . In contrast, the transfer payment P cr n (ξ) is independent of X s n . Because X s n is known to both the supplier and the manufacturer with certainty, the supplier would build X s n units of capacity regardless of whether he has the manufacturer private information or not. Hence, both with and without the capacity reservation contract, the supplier earns (w − c − c n )X s n and the manufacturer earns (r − w)X s n with certainty. As a result, the transfer payment between the two decision makers is independent of X s n , and the supplier's expected profit consists of (w − c − c n )X s n and π cr n (0). The additional part π cr n (0) is the supplier's expected profit when his demand forecast is zero. The same result also holds for the heuristic solution and the resulting expected profit. Next we characterize the optimal stopping policy.
Theorem 23. The following statements are true for all n:
1. A control band policy that offers a capacity reservation contract at period n if X s n ∈ [L n , U n ] is optimal, and the optimal thresholds are given as U n ≡ sup{X s n :
When c n+1 > c n for all n, the upper threshold, U n , is ∞ for all n. Hence, a lower threshold policy that offers the capacity reservation contract at period n if X s n ≥ L n is optimal. 3. Let n * ≡ arg max n π n (0). When c n+1 = c n for all n, a state-independent stopping policy that offers the capacity reservation contract at period n * is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 23. We first note that π w n (X s n ) = π w n (0) + (w − c − c n )X s n . Hence, regardless of whether the supplier offers the optimal menu or the heuristic menu, we have π n (X s n ) = π n (0) + (w − c − c n )X s n . Then, we prove Part 1. As in the multiplicative case, we define M n (X s n ) ≡ E[π n+1 (X s n+1 )|X s n ] − π n (X s n ), and B n (X s n ) ≡ E[V n+1 (X s n+1 )|X s n ] − π n (X s n ). These two functions have the following relationship: B n (X s n ) = E[max{0, B n+1 (X s n+1 )}|X s n ] + M n (X s n ), for n < N − 1, and B N −1 (X s N −1 ) = M N −1 (X s N −1 ). We have M n (X s n ) = E[π n+1 (X s n+1 )|X s n ] − π n (X s n ) = π n+1 (0) − π n (0) − (c n+1 − c n )X s n , which is a convex function of X s n . Then, the rest of the proof is the same as the proof of Theorem 12.
For Part 2, note that M n (X s n ) = π n+1 (0) − π n (0) − (c n+1 − c n )X s n is a decreasing function of X s n when c n is increasing with n. Then, we prove by induction that B n (X s n ) is decreasing in X s n for every n. At period N − 1, we have B N −1 (X s N −1 ) = M N −1 (X s N −1 ), which is decreasing in X s N −1 . Next assume for an induction argument that B n+1 (X) is decreasing in X. Then, the composition max{0, B n+1 (X)} is also decreasing in X because function max{0, X} is an increasing function. For any realization of δ s n , max{0, B n+1 (X s n+1 )} is decreasing in X s n , which implies that E[max{0, B n+1 (X s n+1 )}|X s n ] is decreasing in X s n . Therefore, B n (X s n ) = E[max{0, B n+1 (X s n+1 )}|X s n ]+ M n (X s n ) is also decreasing in X s n , which concludes the induction argument. If B n (X s n ) is decreasing, B n (X s n ) ≤ 0 if and only if X s n ≥ L n , which concludes Part 2.
For Part 3, we define η n ≡ max m>n π m (0). We prove by induction that B n (X s n ) = η n − π n (0) for all n. For period n = N − 1, we have B n (X s n ) = M n (X s n ) = π n+1 (0) − π n (0), where η n = π n+1 (0) by definition. Next assume for an induction argument that B n+1 (X s n ) = η n+1 − π n+1 (0). If η n+1 ≥ π n+1 (0), then η n = η n+1 and B n (X s n ) = η n+1 − π n+1 (0) + M n (X s n ) = η n+1 − π n (0) = η n − π n (0). If η n+1 < π n+1 (0), then η n = π n+1 (0) and B n (X s n ) = 0 + M n (X s n ) = η n − π n (0), which concludes the induction argument. We next prove that the optimal policy always stops at period n * . For n < n * , η n = π n * (0), and hence η n > π n (0) by the definition of n * . In this case, B n (X s n ) ≥ 0 for all X s n , and it is always optimal to continue the process. For n = n * , we have η n * ≤ π n (0), which implies that B n (X s n ) ≤ 0. Hence, the optimal policy always stops at period n * .
The optimality of a control band policy holds as in the multiplicative case. Note that in the additive case, the impacts of the demand uncertainty, information asymmetry, and the fixed capacity cost are all independent of the forecast level, whereas the impact of the unit capacity cost increases as the forecast level increases. When the unit capacity cost increases over time, the penalty of delaying the capacity decision increases as the forecast level increases. Thus, the supplier should optimally offer the contract when his demand forecast is large. Finally, when the unit capacity cost is constant over time, the optimal stopping policy is independent of the forecast level.
